Renewable Portfolio Standard Reduction Mechanism Design Based on the Actual Contribution to Renewable Energy Consumption

As China's Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) policy is gradually implemented, provinces are actively promoting the allocation of RPS compliance targets to various obligated entities. Currently, RPS accounting primarily considers renewable energy consumption through market transactions, such as green electricity trading and green certificate trading, while overlooking the impact of electricity usage behavior on the actual contribution to the system's renewable energy consumption from a physical perspective. This approach fails to incentivize users to enhance their renewable energy contribution by changing their electricity usage behavior. In this context, this paper proposes a metric to quantify the actual contribution of users to renewable energy consumption. Based on this metric, an RPS reduction mechanism is designed. Finally, a master-slave game model is constructed, considering the mutual influence between incentives from electric vehicle aggregator (EVA) and the charging behavior of electric vehicle (EV), to study the dynamic demand response incentive mechanism and RPS compliance strategy for EVA. Case analysis shows that this RPS reduction mechanism can increase the actual renewable energy consumption in the system and reduce the RPS compliance costs for EVA.