Al-Firāsah as a Basic Condition for Achieving Justice in the Judiciary

The disagreement among scholars in the field of Islamic jurisprudence requires in-depth research to shed light on opposing viewpoints. Unfortunately, Ibn al-Qayyim’s (d. 751/1350) assumptions about the use of firāsah (ability to interpret signs and contextual evidence) in the judiciary did not receive much attention, despite his efforts to revitalise traditional jurisprudence by adding new meanings and purposes. This study aims to present a comprehensive view of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theory of firāsah in the judiciary. It seeks to answer the following questions: What is Ibn al-Qayyim’s vision of firāsah and what is his legal evidence for it? What are the methods for applying it in the judiciary? What is the position of Muslim scholars regarding his views? The study arrived at some valuable conclusions that can be summarised as follows: Justice is the most important goal of Islam, and to achieve it, the arbiter must use multiple means in addition to confession and witnesses, such as indication (qarīnah), sign (imārah), and circumstantial evidence. Successful firāsah depends on two factors: the sharpness of the arbiter’s mind and the clarity of evidence. Ibn al-Qayyim employed several categories of firāsah, including inferring internal states from external gestures, inferring the recondite from facial reactions and tongue slips, and others. He excluded the Greek physiognomy, which infers dispositions from physical features, as it contradicts Islamic teachings. However, most Muslim scholars strongly opposed his vision, citing authentic ḥadīths as evidence for their views. Ibn al-Qayyim, on the other hand, supported his theory with Qur’ānic verses and the greatest objective of sharī‘ah, which is to achieve justice.