Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods
Abstract Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). We present a vast array of results on the complexity of determining whether it is possible to reach an EF1 allocation from the initial allocation and, if so, the minimum number of exchanges required. In particular, we uncover several distinctions based on the number of agents involved and their utility functions. Furthermore, we derive essentially tight bounds on the worst-case number of exchanges needed to achieve EF1 when the initial allocation is balanced.
Authors
- Naoyuki Kamiyama (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7712-2730)
- Sheung Man Yuen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8621-5402)
- Warut Suksompong (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8973-2539)
Institutions
- Kyushu University (JP)
- National University of Singapore (SG)
- Kyoto University of Education (JP)
- The University of Tokyo (JP)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Algorithmica
- Published
- 2026-06-29
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-026-01401-8
- Primary Topic
- EU Law and Policy Analysis
- Type
- preprint
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National University of Singapore
- Ministry of Education - Singapore
- Ministry of Education, India
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
- Japan Science and Technology Agency
- Precursory Research for Embryonic Science and Technology
- Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology