"One-size-fits-all" or "Collusion"?— Current Chinese Local Government Policy Implementation Choices for Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection

In recent years, the Chinese central government has issued a series of energy conservation and environmental protection policies to promote China 's ecological civilization construction. As the main executor of the central government 's energy conservation and environmental protection policy, local governments in China should have implemented the policy as required. However, some local governments in China, regardless of the specific reality of the implementation object and policy environment, promote the implementation of the policy in a simple “One-size-fits-all” way, while other local governments selectively implement the central policy and resort to fraud in the face of inspections. Grassroots governments and local governments at higher levels are so tacitly " conspiring " that the ecological and environmental protection policies of the Chinese central government cannot be fully implemented and the policy effectiveness cannot be fully demonstrated. Why do China 's local governments still have these situations in the process of policy implementation when the Chinese central government explicitly prohibits them ? Why do local governments make a choice between “One-size-fits-all” and " collusion " ? Taking the implementation of energy conservation and emission reduction policies and environmental protection policies in S city of China as an example, this paper puts forward the analysis framework of " local government execution resources-time " to analyze the behavior choice of local governments in China. This study finally found that under the common pressure of completing tasks and superior inspections, Chinese local governments will choose to adopt “One-size-fits-all” behavior or " collusion " behavior according to the matching degree of their own execution resources and time resources. The research in this paper helps to better understand the logic of Chinese local governments ' choice of policy implementation methods, and also has certain reference significance for Chinese local governments ' choice of policy implementation methods in other fields.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Computing and Information Technology
Published
2024-12-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.56028/ijcit.2.4.1.2024
Primary Topic
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

"One-size-fits-all" or "Collusion"?— Current Chinese Local Government Policy Implementation Choices for Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection

Zhiyuan Ma, Yanglei Geng, Yuhao Jiang
International Journal of Computing and Information Technology
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
article

"One-size-fits-all" or "Collusion"?— Current Chinese Local Government Policy Implementation Choices for Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection

Zhiyuan Ma, Yanglei Geng, Yuhao Jiang
article en

Abstract

In recent years, the Chinese central government has issued a series of energy conservation and environmental protection policies to promote China 's ecological civilization construction. As the main executor of the central government 's energy conservation and environmental protection policy, local governments in China should have implemented the policy as required. However, some local governments in China, regardless of the specific reality of the implementation object and policy environment, promote the implementation of the policy in a simple “One-size-fits-all” way, while other local governments selectively implement the central policy and resort to fraud in the face of inspections. Grassroots governments and local governments at higher levels are so tacitly " conspiring " that the ecological and environmental protection policies of the Chinese central government cannot be fully implemented and the policy effectiveness cannot be fully demonstrated. Why do China 's local governments still have these situations in the process of policy implementation when the Chinese central government explicitly prohibits them ? Why do local governments make a choice between “One-size-fits-all” and " collusion " ? Taking the implementation of energy conservation and emission reduction policies and environmental protection policies in S city of China as an example, this paper puts forward the analysis framework of " local government execution resources-time " to analyze the behavior choice of local governments in China. This study finally found that under the common pressure of completing tasks and superior inspections, Chinese local governments will choose to adopt “One-size-fits-all” behavior or " collusion " behavior according to the matching degree of their own execution resources and time resources. The research in this paper helps to better understand the logic of Chinese local governments ' choice of policy implementation methods, and also has certain reference significance for Chinese local governments ' choice of policy implementation methods in other fields.

International Journal of Computing and Information TechnologyVol. 4(2)
China University of Petroleum, Beijing (CN)
Life in Land
Openalex Percentile: Top 70%
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
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