A Pact with the Devil: The Madman Theory and Nonaggression Pacts

Abstract This study explores the onset of nonaggression pacts at the individual level, focusing on how leaders’ perceived madness influences security agreements. While the Madman Theory suggests that perceived madness could be an asset in crisis bargaining, it also signals uncertainty and hostility to other states. Consequently, states seek security assurances through nonaggression pacts to manage the risks posed by such leaders. On the other hand, leaders adopting the Madman strategy may strategically pursue these pacts as signaling devices to alleviate diplomatic isolation and mitigate their overall reputation for madness for strategic purposes. By utilizing McManus’s perception-based measures, my findings indicate that leaders with a strong reputation for madness significantly influence the formation of nonaggression pacts, whereas moderate levels of madness do not have the same effect. The impact of a strong reputation for madness diminishes when states are distant from the mad leader or are protected by more military alliances. This study sheds light on the role of leaders’ reputations in security agreements and extends the scope of the Madman Theory beyond crisis bargaining to broader contexts of security cooperation.