Couldn’t Be Happier: The Non-Identity Intuition and Valuing People

Abstract This paper raises a worry about the non-identity intuition. As one part of the non-identity problem, the non-identity intuition tells us that when choosing between bringing a person with a good life into existence and bringing a person with a great life into existence, we have moral reason to bring the person with a great life into existence. But there is a worry to be had about the non-identity intuition. Because the non-identity intuition compares future persons exclusively in regard to their well-being, the non-identity intuition values future persons solely for the well-being enjoyed by each of them. Therefore, or so the worry goes, the non-identity intuition fails to be compatible with what it means to value persons for their own sake.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Moral Philosophy
Published
2024-12-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20244363
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Couldn’t Be Happier: The Non-Identity Intuition and Valuing People

Jessica J.T. Fischer
Journal of Moral Philosophy
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
article

Couldn’t Be Happier: The Non-Identity Intuition and Valuing People

Jessica J.T. Fischer
article en

Abstract

Abstract This paper raises a worry about the non-identity intuition. As one part of the non-identity problem, the non-identity intuition tells us that when choosing between bringing a person with a good life into existence and bringing a person with a great life into existence, we have moral reason to bring the person with a great life into existence. But there is a worry to be had about the non-identity intuition. Because the non-identity intuition compares future persons exclusively in regard to their well-being, the non-identity intuition values future persons solely for the well-being enjoyed by each of them. Therefore, or so the worry goes, the non-identity intuition fails to be compatible with what it means to value persons for their own sake.

Journal of Moral PhilosophyVol. 22(05-06)
University of Bristol (GB)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 59%
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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