Asymmetric Information Infrastructure Network Attack-Defense Game False Network Construction Model

Key infrastructure networks play an increasingly vital role in societal production and daily life. Thus, the study of defensive strategies against attacks on these infrastructures is crucial. The framework of network attack-defense games provides a solution to this problem, facilitating the rapid and efficient allocation of defense resources. Existing models of complex network attack-defense games are predominantly assume symmetric complete information between attackers and defenders regarding the target network's topology, wherein both sides possess full, accurate knowledge of the target network. However, in actual combat scenarios, battlefield conditions are rapidly changing, and information channels are complex, making it impossible for both attackers and defenders to simultaneously possess complete information about the target network. This paper therefore introduces asymmetric information into existing models of complex network attack-defense games. First, it constructs false networks via two methods: random edge additions/deletions and random node additions/deletions. Second, it defines the cost of strategies and the success rate of attacks based on node attributes in the network. Finally, equilibrium solutions are sought for the game on small-scale networks. The experimental results demonstrate that both proposed methods for constructing false networks effectively protect the network, with random node additions/deletions exerting a greater influence on the network's topology.