ESOP, Double Agency Cost, and Labor Investment Efficiency

Based on the data of Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2022, this paper investigates the impact of employee stock ownership plan implementation on labor investment efficiency. It is found that the implementation of ESOP can significantly improve the efficiency of labor investment, and in this process, the double agency cost plays a part of the intermediary role. In order to solve the potential endogeneity problem caused by self-selection bias, this paper uses the results of propensity score matching to perform regression again, and the conclusion remains unchanged. Further research shows that employee stock ownership plans improve labor investment efficiency mainly by improving labor overinvestment rather than labor underinvestment, and the improvement effect of employee stock ownership plans on labor overinvestment is more significant in private enterprises. On the whole, this paper explores the influencing factors of labor investment efficiency from a new perspective, and provides a reference for enterprises and related departments to improve the efficiency of labor resource allocation.