Old Enough to Carry, Old Enough to Vote

ABSTRACT Japa Pallikkathayil persuasively argues that abortion prohibitions treat impregnable people as less than equal citizens, subject to different treatment than other citizens whose bodies are protected from compulsory service for the benefit of others. Pallikkathayil's argument could be modified to avoid a tension with arguments for conscription, to stress that democratic equality is inconsistent with requisitioning a citizen's body to serve the needs of another specific citizen. Pallikkathayil also contends that ‘[t]he changes we would need to make to our other laws and practices to bring them into line with restrictive abortion laws are intuitively unattractive’. To complement her approach, I contend that consistency would require that if we subject minors to involuntary pregnancy and labor, then we should enfranchise minors. We lowered the voting age to 18 on the grounds that if military conscripts were ‘old enough to fight’, they were ‘old enough to vote’. Abortion restrictions conscript impregnable minors and subject them to involuntary bodily intrusions, major life disruptions, and responsibility over life and death decisions. Old enough to carry; old enough to vote. If that conclusion is unpalatable because minors seem too immature to vote, then perhaps they are too immature to be forced to carry a pregnancy and to give birth.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Applied Philosophy
Published
2024-12-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12781
Primary Topic
Political Philosophy and Ethics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Old Enough to Carry, Old Enough to Vote

Seana Valentine Shiffrin
Journal of Applied Philosophy
Political Philosophy and Ethics
article

Old Enough to Carry, Old Enough to Vote

Seana Valentine Shiffrin
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT Japa Pallikkathayil persuasively argues that abortion prohibitions treat impregnable people as less than equal citizens, subject to different treatment than other citizens whose bodies are protected from compulsory service for the benefit of others. Pallikkathayil's argument could be modified to avoid a tension with arguments for conscription, to stress that democratic equality is inconsistent with requisitioning a citizen's body to serve the needs of another specific citizen. Pallikkathayil also contends that ‘[t]he changes we would need to make to our other laws and practices to bring them into line with restrictive abortion laws are intuitively unattractive’. To complement her approach, I contend that consistency would require that if we subject minors to involuntary pregnancy and labor, then we should enfranchise minors. We lowered the voting age to 18 on the grounds that if military conscripts were ‘old enough to fight’, they were ‘old enough to vote’. Abortion restrictions conscript impregnable minors and subject them to involuntary bodily intrusions, major life disruptions, and responsibility over life and death decisions. Old enough to carry; old enough to vote. If that conclusion is unpalatable because minors seem too immature to vote, then perhaps they are too immature to be forced to carry a pregnancy and to give birth.

Journal of Applied PhilosophyVol. 42(2)
Gender equality
Openalex Percentile: Top 60%
Political Philosophy and Ethics
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.