Can rules ground moral obligations?

Abstract What are the principles that ground our moral obligations? One obvious answer is that they are prescriptive rules that govern conduct by imposing obligations much like (certain) legal rules govern conduct by imposing legal obligations. This rule conception of moral principles merits our attention for at least three reasons. It's the obvious and most straightforward way to develop the analogy between morality and law, and between moral principles and legal rules. It appears to fit some prominent theories of morality and justice (e.g., Brad Hooker's rule‐consequentialism, David Gauthier's contractarianism, and John Rawls's contractualism), and thus to possibly derive support from its fit with them. And it promises to account for the ability of moral principles to do the explanatory, counterfactual‐supporting, and necessity‐grounding work that they do. Moreover, it seems to be an integral part of some prominent theories (e.g., those of Gauthier, Kant, and Christine Korsgaard). However, I will argue that we should reject it. Moreover, by warranting the rejection of an obvious rival, the arguments presented herein strengthen the case for a dispositional (or powers) conception of moral principles, and perhaps for certain other conceptions, as well.