Designing Confucian democracy: A semi‐parliamentarian framework

Abstract Despite Confucian democrats’ successful attempt in establishing Confucian democracy as a normatively plausible ideal, little has been said regarding its institutional design. However, to the extent that Confucian democracy involves some synthesis between a formally democratic regime and substantively Confucian ends, it has to ask for a more specific choice among various possible democratic institutional frameworks, so as to make sure that the exact form of the former is conducive to the realization of the latter. This article addresses such a question by presenting semi‐parliamentarianism as an appropriate institutional framework for designing Confucian democracy. My central claim is that compared with other types of constitutional structure, a semi‐parliamentarian bicameral one is more likely to simultaneously advance Confucian democrats’ dual commitments to benevolent government and deep harmony. The article thus contributes to both the “institutional turn” in democratic theory and the “meritocracy versus democracy” debate in contemporary Confucian political theory.