Evolutionary Game Analysis of Campus Online Fraud Issues
Using evolutionary game theory, this study explores the issue of cyber scams in campuses, establishing an asymmetric evolutionary game model between law enforcement and scam perpetrators. The study utilizes the theory of local stability of differential equations to discuss evolutionary stable strategies under various parameter levels. Based on this, corresponding policy recommendations are proposed.
Authors
- Xue Dong He (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2510-9822)
- Mingyi He (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2051-6955)
- Yonghong Shen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1525-851X)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Advances in Education Humanities and Social Science Research
- Published
- 2024-12-04
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.56028/aehssr.12.1.313.2024
- Primary Topic
- Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Lanzhou City University