Understanding the Intersection of Central Environmental Protection Inspections and Green Investment Through Game Theory

The Central Environmental Protection Inspector (CEPI) is an innovation in China’s environmental regulation. This paper uses game theory to analyze the influence of the CEPI on enterprises’ green investment. Firstly, by constructing the game model of “central government-local government-polluting enterprises”, the factors affecting green investment strategy are analyzed. Then, with the help of a system simulation model, the influence of parameters on system stability and convergence trends is analyzed, so as to obtain the influence of the CEPI on enterprise green investment. The results show the following: (1) The CEPI can effectively promote preventive green investment, and the promotion effect of preventive green investment is proportional to its risk; (2) The effect of the CEPI on local governments is not obvious; (3) The cost of the CEPI is too high, and polluting enterprises are quick to choose remedial green investment.

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Publication Details

Journal
Systems
Published
2024-12-22
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12120585
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.13
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article

Understanding the Intersection of Central Environmental Protection Inspections and Green Investment Through Game Theory

Hongjie Zhang, Feng He, Paijie Wan, Tingru Zhao et al.
1 citations
Systems
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
1.13
article

Understanding the Intersection of Central Environmental Protection Inspections and Green Investment Through Game Theory

Hongjie Zhang, Feng He, Paijie Wan, Tingru Zhao, Xiaoqing Hou
article en
1 citations

Abstract

The Central Environmental Protection Inspector (CEPI) is an innovation in China’s environmental regulation. This paper uses game theory to analyze the influence of the CEPI on enterprises’ green investment. Firstly, by constructing the game model of “central government-local government-polluting enterprises”, the factors affecting green investment strategy are analyzed. Then, with the help of a system simulation model, the influence of parameters on system stability and convergence trends is analyzed, so as to obtain the influence of the CEPI on enterprise green investment. The results show the following: (1) The CEPI can effectively promote preventive green investment, and the promotion effect of preventive green investment is proportional to its risk; (2) The effect of the CEPI on local governments is not obvious; (3) The cost of the CEPI is too high, and polluting enterprises are quick to choose remedial green investment.

SystemsVol. 12(12)
University of Science and Technology Beijing (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 10%
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
1.13
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