The Relationship Between Economic Elites and Military Coups: Case of Türkiye

The political and economic history of Türkiye over the past century has been deeply influenced by a series of military coups, notably those of 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. These coups profoundly reshaped the country's political landscape and economic structure. This study investigates the research question: How have military coups in Türkiye protected and strengthened the interests of economic elites while shaping the power dynamics between economic, military, and political elites? Employing elite theory as its analytical framework, the research adopts a qualitative, interpretive methodology to explore the interactions between these elite groups. The findings reveal that military interventions have consistently acted as mechanisms to safeguard the interests of economic elites, enabling them to preserve and expand their economic power. In return, military elites solidified their authority through alliances with economic elites, often facilitated by neoliberal policies and structural reforms. The study highlights how these coups not only reinforced capitalist dominance but also entrenched the interdependence of military, political, and economic power in Türkiye. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the socio-economic and political transformations triggered by military interventions had consequences, aligning the country's economic policies with the interests of large capital groups while marginalizing broader social segments. By situating Türkiye's military coups within a comparative context, the study provides insights into the relationship between elite power structures and political economy.