The Systematic Relation between the Notions of Predisposition to Good and Propensity to Evil

Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason has been a controversial text within Kant scholarship since its earliest reception. One of the main reasons for the critical reception relates to Kant’s theory of radical evil and the notion of propensity to evil connected therewith. It has become a commonplace in Kant literature to attribute these Kantian doctrines to a sort of late concession to Christian theology, as can be observed in the tenor of the reception by e.g. Goethe, Schiller and Michalson (1990), among others. Against this view, I aim to show in this article that the most striking and controversial claims contained in Kant’s doctrine of evil, namely the assumption of an intelligible deed, the universality of evil in humans as well as the inextirpability of the propensity to evil, can be accounted for by paying attention to the systematic relation between Kant’s notions of Anlage and Hang and the key trait distinguishing them, namely practical objectivity. By doing so, it shall become clear that Kant’s main contentious claims in Religion I can be sufficiently explained by systematic commitments of his own critical moral philosophy, thus rendering the references to Christian theology found in secondary literature superfluous.