FLARE: Defending Federated Learning Against Model Poisoning Attacks via Latent Space Representations

Federated learning (FL) has been shown vulnerable to a new class of adversarial attacks, known as <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">model poisoning attacks (MPA)</i>, where one or more malicious clients try to poison the global model by sending carefully crafted local model updates to the central parameter server. Existing defenses that have been fixated on analyzing model parameters show limited effectiveness in detecting such malicious models. In this work, we propose <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small>, a robust model aggregation mechanism for FL, which is resilient against state-of-the-art MPAs. Instead of solely depending on model parameters, <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small> leverages the <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">penultimate layer representations (PLRs)</i> of the model for characterizing the adversarial influence on each local model update. We further propose a trust evaluation method that estimates a trust score for each model update based on pairwise PLR discrepancies among all model updates. Under the assumption of honest majority, <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small> assigns a low trust score to model updates that are far from the benign cluster. <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small> then aggregates the model updates weighted by their trust scores and finally updates the global model. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small> in defending FL against various MPAs, including semantic backdoor attacks, trojan backdoor attacks, and untargeted attacks, in various FL systems.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Published
2024-12-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2024.3521297
Citations
5
Primary Topic
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.39
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

FLARE: Defending Federated Learning Against Model Poisoning Attacks via Latent Space Representations

Wenjing Lou, Yang Xiao, Chaoyu Zhang, Y. Thomas Hou et al.
5 citations
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
1.39
article

FLARE: Defending Federated Learning Against Model Poisoning Attacks via Latent Space Representations

Wenjing Lou, Yang Xiao, Chaoyu Zhang, Y. Thomas Hou, Yimin Chen, Ning Wang
article en
5 citations

Abstract

Federated learning (FL) has been shown vulnerable to a new class of adversarial attacks, known as <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">model poisoning attacks (MPA)</i>, where one or more malicious clients try to poison the global model by sending carefully crafted local model updates to the central parameter server. Existing defenses that have been fixated on analyzing model parameters show limited effectiveness in detecting such malicious models. In this work, we propose <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small>, a robust model aggregation mechanism for FL, which is resilient against state-of-the-art MPAs. Instead of solely depending on model parameters, <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small> leverages the <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">penultimate layer representations (PLRs)</i> of the model for characterizing the adversarial influence on each local model update. We further propose a trust evaluation method that estimates a trust score for each model update based on pairwise PLR discrepancies among all model updates. Under the assumption of honest majority, <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small> assigns a low trust score to model updates that are far from the benign cluster. <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small> then aggregates the model updates weighted by their trust scores and finally updates the global model. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">FLARE</small> in defending FL against various MPAs, including semantic backdoor attacks, trojan backdoor attacks, and untargeted attacks, in various FL systems.

IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure ComputingVol. 22(3)
University of Massachusetts Lowell (US), University of Kentucky (US), University of South Florida (US), Virginia Tech (US)
Gender equality
Openalex Percentile: Top 15%
Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
1.39
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.