Dignidad y persona. Líneas jurisprudenciales en el discurso de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos

This paper analyzes how the term dignity appears in relation to the term person in the discourse of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It emphasizes the paragraphs in which the Interamerican Court has referred to both notions and the formulas it uses in this regard, aiming to expose dynamic relationships between them. The purpose is to detect and describe the formulas in which these terms appear in the Court’s discourse over time, in relation to specific factual scenarios and the interaction between the paragraphs containing those formulas. The hypothesis guiding this paper is that, although these formulas are relevant in the Court’s judgments and opinions to support arguments, they do not possess concrete content with directives on how to put into practice the human rights in question or how to interpret what it means for a person to have dignity.