Towards organic collaborative governance for a more sustainable environment: Evolutionary game analysis within the policy implementation of China's net-zero emissions goals

Many countries in the world have pledged to achieve net-zero emissions goals, implementing a range of relevant policies. As the key implementers in these initiatives, the collaboration between government and enterprise is crucial for the realization of net-zero emissions goals and better sustainable environment. However, the heterogeneous interests of these stakeholders often lead to a game. This research constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the interactions between government and enterprises, utilizing field studies from China and extensive literature review, to illustrate the behavioral strategies and game dynamics of the two parties. The results show that optimal outcomes are achieved when the government effectively engages enterprises, who in turn actively participate in these initiatives. In addition, this study explores how adjusting game parameters, optimizing the distribution of costs and benefits, and establishing incentive-compatible mechanisms can align the strategic behaviors of both parties towards a more stable equilibrium. This approach facilitates a more organic collaborative governance for better sustainable environment, which has proved fundamental for the robust implementation of net-zero emissions policies. The insights provided in this research broaden the theoretical boundaries of climate governance and policy implementation, providing practical guidelines for policy implementers engaged in net-zero emissions and sustainable environment.