A Study of Street Vendor Economy from the Perspective of a Tripartite Evolutionary Game

The street vendor economy holds significant importance for post-pandemic economic recovery. However, there exists a complex web of interests among the government, street vendors, and the public. Grounded in the theory of evolutionary games, this study investigates the strategic interactions among these three parties within the street vendor economy and conducts simulation analyses. These research findings highlight the substantial influence of government management strategies on the behavior of street vendors. Strict regulations can curb irregular operations, and appropriately designed punitive measures can effectively deter non-compliant behaviors. Conversely, lax management might lead to an increase in irregular operations, yet optimizing the management approach can steer street vendors toward more standardized practices. Furthermore, additional gains also impact the behavioral choices of street vendors, but the urban governance issues stemming from non-compliant operations need to be addressed. During intricate conflicts of interest among the government, street vendors, and the public, this study provides a theoretical and practical reference for tackling the management and developmental challenges within the street vendor economy.