Research on NEV Credit Pricing and Enterprise Compliance Management Based on Multi party Game Theory

The "The Passenger Cars Corporate Average Fuel Consumption and New Energy Vehicle Credit Regulation" (dual-credit policy) impose mandatory assessment regulations on the proportion of enterprises producing new energy passenger vehicles and traditional fuel passenger vehicles. Enterprises that meet the assessment standards will receive positive NEV credits, while those that do not meet the standards will receive negative NEV credits, and they will be forced to purchase positive NEV credits to achieve compliance. At present, the industry lacks quantitative understanding of the price of NEV credits, and due to the particularity of NEV credits, seller enterprises with positive credits are difficult to price during the transaction process, while buyer enterprises with negative credits also face compliance risks of transaction failure. We explore the underlying logic of NEV credit pricing and, for the first time, combine game theory to establish a NEV credit price prediction model for information exchange between seller and buyer enterprises. It can stably output NEV credit price prediction results, support positive credit enterprises in commodity pricing management, and also legal compliance management of negative credit enterprises.