Local institutional strategies and responses to climate change risks in the Indian Sundarbans: A political economic analysis

In this article, we use a political economic analysis in arguing that climate change risks and vulnerabilities are often produced and sustained through inappropriate, loosely designed and socially contested institutional mechanisms. Using ethnography, we contribute to the existing social science scholarship on climate vulnerability and risk by focusing on a political economic analysis of how risks are framed and responded at local institutional levels in the Indian Sundarbans. Our paper offers place-based nuances of climate politics to show how local institutions are characterised by power relations, economic incentives and political influences while facilitating and deploying climate risk management strategies. Empirical findings from our study highlight that neoliberal approaches to climate risk management facilitated by local institutions reveal predominant market mechanisms, patron–clientele relations and technologically engineered solutions to create local climate economies. From our findings, we conclude that political economy of climate change can explain why and how adaptation policies become ineffective in everyday experiences of precarious living.