When partisanship and technocratic credibility collide: mass attitudes and central bank endorsements of fiscal policy in Canada and the USA

Abstract Developments over the past decade have made it increasingly difficult for central banks to achieve their macroeconomic objectives without the help of fiscal policy, resulting in some surprisingly public efforts from central banks to influence the size and direction of government budget balances. But do voters find central bank appeals persuasive and what are the reputational consequences of engaging the public on this sensitive issue, particularly in the event of partisan counterattacks? We examine these issues with two parallel survey experiments conducted in Canada and the USA. The results suggest central bank endorsements modestly increased support for expansionary fiscal policies. They also suggest the right’s attack on the central bank may have backfired—ultimately improving rather than undermining the bank’s reputation among non-conservatives. This research has implications for theoretical work in political psychology and public economics and for on-going empirical debates about voters’ attitudes toward austerity.