Of Rats and Men I: A Pragmatist Take on the Concept of Free Will as a Challenge to the Human-Animal Dichotomy

The article is the first part of a triptych on agency. It critically analyses those arguments drawing from the notion of free will (FW) that most frequently resurface in discussions of non-human minds within the context of the human-animal divide. By embedding the investigation within pragmatic philosophy, backed by broadly understood cognitive sciences, the author argues that this web of assertions is unconvincing, as FW’s ontology: 1) is inconsistent with current empirical knowledge; 2) appears to be a superficial construct, failing to reflect the intricacies of human decision-making processes; and 3) is inconsequential for experience. Rather than being a unique capability of the mind, FW reveals itself as an anthropocentric and WEIRD-made artefact, which lacks explanatory power regarding human behaviour. As such, when applied to non-human species, it qualifies as anthropofabulation. Consequently, the author proposes replacing FW with an empirically informed concept of agency derived from Karl Friston’s free-energy principle, supported by insights from the processual philosophy of biology. Such a framework allows for capturing the nature of agency in its advanced form, plausibly shared with at least some other species. It thus facilitates the construction of gradable concepts of moral agency, in the likes of Mark Rowlands’s category of “the moral subject.” Subsequent articles will discuss this subject matter further.