Does Ernest Nagel’s Model of Reduction Permit Ontological Reduction?

Abstract This article resolves and draws lessons from the recent controversy over whether Ernest Nagel’s model of reduction permits ontological reduction. The resolution lies in distinguishing between two types of ontological reduction: while Nagel’s model accommodates ontological reduction 1 , it rejects ontological reduction 2 . Ontological reduction 1 concerns the relationships among worldly things, mediated by theories and statements, as is generally asserted by logical empiricists. In contrast, ontological reduction 2 , which often leads to eliminativism, arbitrarily designates certain entities as fundamental while treating others merely derivative. Two key lessons emerge from this controversy. First, it is easy to conflate these two types of ontological reduction. Second, emphasizing the epistemological foundations of reduction is crucial to avoid such conflation and the associated dogmatic tendencies, such as eliminativism and emergentism. This analysis uncovers a critical yet underappreciated rationale for Nagel’s preference for an epistemological presentation of his model of reduction.