Analog Circuit Anti-Piracy Security by Exploiting Device Ratings

We propose a novel anti-piracy security technique for analog and mixed-signal (AMS) circuits. The circuit is re-designed by obfuscating transistors and capacitors with key-controlled versions. We obfuscate both the device geometries and their ratings, which define the maximum allowable current, voltage, and power dissipation. The circuit is designed to function correctly only with a specific key. Loading any other incorrect key degrades performance and for the vast majority of these keys the chip is damaged because of electrical over-stress. This prevents counter-attacks that employ a chip to search for the correct key. The methodology is demonstrated on a low-dropout regulator (LDO) designed in the 22nm FDSOI technology by GlobalFoundries. By locking the LDO, the entire chip functionality breaks unless the LDO is unlocked first. The secured LDO shows no performance penalty and area overhead is justifiable and less than 25%, while it is protected against all known counter-attacks in the AMS domain.

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Publication Details

Published
2025-03-31
DOI
https://doi.org/10.23919/date64628.2025.10992961
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.54
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article

Analog Circuit Anti-Piracy Security by Exploiting Device Ratings

Hassan Aboushady, Haralampos‐G. Stratigopoulos, Hazem H. Hammam
2 citations
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
4.54
article

Analog Circuit Anti-Piracy Security by Exploiting Device Ratings

Hassan Aboushady, Haralampos‐G. Stratigopoulos, Hazem H. Hammam
article en
2 citations

Abstract

We propose a novel anti-piracy security technique for analog and mixed-signal (AMS) circuits. The circuit is re-designed by obfuscating transistors and capacitors with key-controlled versions. We obfuscate both the device geometries and their ratings, which define the maximum allowable current, voltage, and power dissipation. The circuit is designed to function correctly only with a specific key. Loading any other incorrect key degrades performance and for the vast majority of these keys the chip is damaged because of electrical over-stress. This prevents counter-attacks that employ a chip to search for the correct key. The methodology is demonstrated on a low-dropout regulator (LDO) designed in the 22nm FDSOI technology by GlobalFoundries. By locking the LDO, the entire chip functionality breaks unless the LDO is unlocked first. The secured LDO shows no performance penalty and area overhead is justifiable and less than 25%, while it is protected against all known counter-attacks in the AMS domain.

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR), Sorbonne Université (FR)
Openalex Percentile: Top 8%
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
4.54
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