The Importance of a Liberal Power’s Attention to Democratic Elections Around the World

We build on the concept of attention costs in international affairs: When the agenda of powerful states is crowded, other states can get away with behavior the powerful state would otherwise sanction. Our example focuses on the United States as a liberal power promoting democratic elections. We use a game to demonstrate that greater attention costs by the “supervising” liberal power result in more cheating by foreign incumbents. We utilize the US domestic election cycle to predict variation in attention costs. Because they need to focus on reelection, American policymakers have less effort to devote to other policy objectives. We show that this is the case with a novel measure of attention to elections abroad. Finally, we construct an index of bias to show that presidential elections in the US are associated with more biased elections abroad. We conclude by noting that international pressure may keep cheating incumbents in check.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Journal of Politics
Published
2024-12-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1086/734276
Primary Topic
Economic Sanctions and International Relations
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

The Importance of a Liberal Power’s Attention to Democratic Elections Around the World

Nikolay Marinov, Ashrakat Elshehawy, Federico Nanni, Johannes Bubeck
The Journal of Politics
Economic Sanctions and International Relations
article

The Importance of a Liberal Power’s Attention to Democratic Elections Around the World

Nikolay Marinov, Ashrakat Elshehawy, Federico Nanni, Johannes Bubeck
article en

Abstract

We build on the concept of attention costs in international affairs: When the agenda of powerful states is crowded, other states can get away with behavior the powerful state would otherwise sanction. Our example focuses on the United States as a liberal power promoting democratic elections. We use a game to demonstrate that greater attention costs by the “supervising” liberal power result in more cheating by foreign incumbents. We utilize the US domestic election cycle to predict variation in attention costs. Because they need to focus on reelection, American policymakers have less effort to devote to other policy objectives. We show that this is the case with a novel measure of attention to elections abroad. Finally, we construct an index of bias to show that presidential elections in the US are associated with more biased elections abroad. We conclude by noting that international pressure may keep cheating incumbents in check.

The Journal of PoliticsVol. 87(4)
Film Independent (US), The Alan Turing Institute (GB), University of Gothenburg (SE), Stanford University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 72%
Economic Sanctions and International Relations
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