The Razian Response to Philosophical Anarchism: A Probe into the Authority‐Autonomy Tension

Abstract This paper juxtaposes two conflicting positions on the justifiability of authority: Robert Wolff's philosophical anarchist argument and a response to Wolff consisting in Joseph Raz's service conception of authority. Following an introduction, I provide a brief exposition of Wolff's claim that authority is incompatible with moral autonomy (Section 2). After presenting the Razian response (Section 3), I consider what implications follow from Raz's service conception of authority assuming it is correct (Section 4). I argue that, even if the service conception successfully meets the anarchist challenge, it does so not by entirely dissolving the tension between authority and autonomy, but through a balancing act whereby one aspect of our autonomy gives way to another aspect of our autonomy. Finally, I consider the service conception of authority itself and point out certain vulnerabilities thereof (Section 5).