Closure of Constraints as a Theoretical Model
Abstract In this paper I offer a model-theoretic interpretation of Autonomy Theory as defended by Moreno, Mossio, Montévil, and Bich. I address accusations that Autonomy Theory is excessively liberal, such as those made by Garson (2017), arguing that these misunderstand the role of strategic abstractions and generalizations in theory construction. Conceiving of closure of constraints as a model-building effort that emphasizes generality—in the spirit of Levins (1966)—also clarifies its potential for application in empirical contexts.
Authors
- Campbell Rider
Institutions
- The University of Sydney (AU)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Philosophy of Science
- Published
- 2024-12-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2024.63
- Citations
- 2
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy and History of Science
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 12.08
Funders
- University of Sydney