Sitting at the Kantian <i>Table of Nothingness</i>

This article appeals to the table of nothingness ( Nichts ) occurring within Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason [1781; 1787] (1998) to assess three recent accounts of nothingness – (Priest 2014), (Costantini 2020), and (Casati &amp; Fujikawa 2019) - under the light of folk preconceptions about nothingness. After defining the two strongest preconceptions as the absence of unrestrictedly everything ( nihil absolutum ) and the idea of nothingness as a self-contradictory item ( nihil negativum ), I argue that both might be read as two Aristotelian ‘connected homonyms’, rather than conflating them into a single item (as Priest’s and Casati &amp; Fujikawa’s accounts seem to do), or dropping the idea of the nihil absolutum , as Costantini’s account does