The subsidy mechanism for green supply chain financing considering consumer preferences

Purpose We aim to determine the subsidy mechanism that can help participants of green supply chain financing (GSCF) maximize their benefits. Then, the optimal subsidy mechanism is designed to promote the development of GSCF. Design/methodology/approach To better understand the impact of different government subsidy measures on the optimal strategy for GSCF, we treat the motivation of the participants in the supply chain as a cost–benefit decision-making process. Then, a Stackelberg game model is developed that accounts for consumers' green preferences and government subsidies. In addition, the factors influencing supply chain members' earnings are analyzed via computational experiments. Findings (1) When consumers 2019 green sensitivity reaches a certain threshold relative to that of core enterprises (CEs), the optimal order quantity of these enterprises is greater when the government subsidizes small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Conversely, the optimal order quantity is greater when CEs are subsidized. (2) When the government subsidizes CEs, financial institutions (FIs) and SMEs at the same time, these forms of subsidies have a cumulative effect on the supply chain, and the supply chain and all participants generate the highest earnings. Originality/value We analyze the benefits of each participant of GSCF under different government subsidies and then determine the optimal subsidy measures.