Disguised Repression: Targeting Opponents with Nonpolitical Crimes to Undermine Dissent

Why do authoritarian regimes charge political opponents with nonpolitical crimes when they can levy charges directly related to opponents’ political activism? We argue that doing so disguises political repression and undermines the moral authority of opponents, minimizing backlash and mobilization. To test this argument, we conduct a survey experiment, which shows that disguised repression decreases perceptions of dissidents’ morality, decreases people’s willingness to engage in dissent on behalf of the dissident, and increases support for repression of the dissident. We then assess the external validity of the argument by analyzing millions of Chinese social media posts made before and after a large crackdown of vocal government critics in China in 2013. We find that individuals with larger online followings are more likely to be charged with nonpolitical crimes, and those charged with nonpolitical crimes are less likely to receive public sympathy and support.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Journal of Politics
Published
2024-12-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1086/734267
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.26
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article

Disguised Repression: Targeting Opponents with Nonpolitical Crimes to Undermine Dissent

Jennifer Pan, Xu Xu, Yiqing Xu
2 citations
The Journal of Politics
Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
2.26
article

Disguised Repression: Targeting Opponents with Nonpolitical Crimes to Undermine Dissent

Jennifer Pan, Xu Xu, Yiqing Xu
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Why do authoritarian regimes charge political opponents with nonpolitical crimes when they can levy charges directly related to opponents’ political activism? We argue that doing so disguises political repression and undermines the moral authority of opponents, minimizing backlash and mobilization. To test this argument, we conduct a survey experiment, which shows that disguised repression decreases perceptions of dissidents’ morality, decreases people’s willingness to engage in dissent on behalf of the dissident, and increases support for repression of the dissident. We then assess the external validity of the argument by analyzing millions of Chinese social media posts made before and after a large crackdown of vocal government critics in China in 2013. We find that individuals with larger online followings are more likely to be charged with nonpolitical crimes, and those charged with nonpolitical crimes are less likely to receive public sympathy and support.

The Journal of PoliticsVol. 88(1)
Princeton University (US), Stanford University (US)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 9%
Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
2.26
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