Advanced Detection and Prevention of Sinkhole Attacks in 6TiSCH Networks

The Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) protocol, fundamental to 6TiSCH networks, enhances network reliability through scheduled channel hopping and time-slotted communication, which reduces interference and increases re-silience. Despite these improvements, RPL-based 6TiSCH networks remain vulnerable to sinkhole attacks where a malicious node redirects traffic to itself, causing network disruptions. In this paper, we present an advanced detection and prevention mechanism for sinkhole attacks in RPL-based 6TiSCH networks. The proposed method leverages the channel hopping features of 6TiSCH and incorporates a comprehensive anomaly detection algorithm to identify and isolate malicious nodes. Our approach is validated through extensive simulations using the Contiki OS and Cooja emulator, demonstrating significant improvements in True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) compared to existing methods such as Sayed et al.'s mechanism. Specifically, our method achieves a TPR of 62.58% and an FPR of 7.69% with one attacker, and a TPR of 85.79% and an FPR of 6.38% with two attackers. Additionally, the proposed method effectively reduces energy consumption by 21.3% and 11.8% in the presence of one and two attackers, respectively, compared to Sayed et al.'s method. Efficient channel management and precise anomaly detection achieve this reduction by minimizing unnecessary control packet transmissions and redundant communication attempts. Our findings highlight the enhanced security, reliability, and energy efficiency of the proposed method, making it a promising solution for safeguarding RPL-based 6TiSCH networks against sinkhole attacks.