A Communication Confrontation Based on the Stackelberg Game: IRS Aids for Improving Anti-Jamming Capability

In communication confrontation, the capabilities of jamming and resisting jamming play a pivotal role in achieving victory. Addressing the lack of dynamism in decision-making during communications counter operations, in this paper, we customize the confrontation process between the communicator and the jammer as a Stackelberg game, where the communicator is the leader and the jammer is the follower. The game process is partitioned into time slots, and to obtain the best strategies of both in each time slot, we propose metrics to evaluate their utilities. The optimization problem is then constructed with the objective function of maximizing their utility metrics. Intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) is introduced to the communication process in order to improve the leader’s immunity to interference. A new optimization method is proposed in this paper to decompose and transform the optimization problem to finally obtain an asymptotic optimal solution. In addition, this paper proves that at least one Stackelberg equation exists, and the communicating party can always make the best decision after the interfering party makes the best decision. Finally, the empirical findings presented in this paper further substantiate that the gaming process ultimately reaches equilibrium. With the assistance of IRS, the communication pair saves power consumption while enhancing its anti-jamming capability.