No Exceptionalism: Norms of Inquiry in the Science of Animal Consciousness

While the science of animal consciousness has seen a surge of new work, its most basic methodology remains highly disputed. In this paper I identify four candidate norms of inquiry that have been implicitly introduced in the recent literature. I call these (1) expansive theorizing, (2) indirect inquiry, (3) lowering epistemic standards, and (4) inflating epistemic standards. In each section, an instantiation of the norm of inquiry is discussed, and the broader lessons that can be taken from avoiding it are drawn out. Interestingly, each of these candidate norms of inquiry have something in common: they implicitly hold that, to study animal consciousness, ordinary scientific standards must in some way be departed from. The overarching claim of this paper is that this is a mistake. In response to this, I propose four alternative candidate norms of inquiry. I call these (1) weighted development, (2) evidential foundations, (3) knowledge directed, and (4) anti-proof. The overarching norm of ‘no exceptionalism’ is then proposed with the goal of establishing a minimal methodological consensus.