Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.

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Publication Details

Journal
Games
Published
2024-12-10
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/g15060044
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.26
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article

Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Anna De Simone
2 citations
Games
Game Theory and Voting Systems
2.26
article

Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Anna De Simone
article en
2 citations

Abstract

We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.

GamesVol. 15(6)
Indiana University Northwest (US), University of Naples Federico II (IT)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 7%
Game Theory and Voting Systems
2.26
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Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions — K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Anna De Simone · Games (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS