Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.
Authors
- K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3017-1981)
- Anna De Simone (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9665-2032)
Institutions
- Indiana University Northwest (US)
- University of Naples Federico II (IT)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Games
- Published
- 2024-12-10
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3390/g15060044
- Citations
- 2
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 2.26