Win-Win Deescalation

Abstract Two states are stuck in a conflict because backing down is costly to their leaders. What can they do to exit the conflict peacefully? We propose a novel mechanism that is practically significant but not yet theorized and tested in international relations: win-win deescalation. One side “wins” because the other backs down, but the other also “wins” because it successfully frames its action to its public as a win. How effective are win frames? How would the public react to their leader’s—and the opponent’s—win frames? Using an original experiment in the midst of an ongoing US–China trade war, we identify win frames that can induce the perception of winning and reduce the public costs of deescalation for the Chinese government. The catch, however, is that when America uses the same win frames, it can compromise the Chinese government’s effort to deescalate the conflict, even when it is America backing down. Our work sheds light on the role of win frames in international conflict and how, in the eyes of domestic audiences, backing down is not necessarily losing—nor is the other backing down necessarily you winning.