Supervision mechanism of integrated construction consultancy services in China: tripartite game analysis

Purpose Megaprojects contribute greatly to China’s socio-economic development. However, the diverse stakeholders of megaprojects tend to be prone to conflict and plunge the project into lower performance than expected. This study aims to investigate (1) the optimal supervision mechanism under direct supervision of the owner and (2) the optimal indirect supervision mechanism of the owner, with involvement of integrated construction consultancy (ICC) in supervision and considerations into the impact of collusion between the ICC and the general contractor on supervision efficiency. Design/methodology/approach This study applies the principal–agent theory and game theory to design effective incentive and punishment mechanisms for direct and indirect supervision by the owner. Through the theoretical framework of game theory, it analyses the strategic interactions between the owner, the ICC and the general contractor, and evaluates the effectiveness of various supervision mechanisms based on Nash equilibrium theory. Findings The results showed adopting the direct supervision mechanism when the probability of the general contractor’s opportunistic behavior being detected was higher or the occurrence had a greater impact on the owner. However, the increase in supervision cost would reduce the motivation of owner’s direct supervision and prompt the owner to choose the indirect supervision mechanism. Additionally, the indirect supervision mechanism was more likely to inhibit the collusion between the ICC and the general contractor. Thus, increasing penalties for ICC would result in improved supervision of ICC, thereby improving the benefits to the owner. Originality/value This study examines the dynamic interaction between the owner, the general contractor and the ICC. The study establishes a game tree and game matrix based on principal–agent theory, and analyses direct and indirect supervision models to determine the Nash equilibrium and optimal supervision strategy that is in the best interest of the owner. The study advocates for improved management and supervision mechanisms and argues that tailored supervision mechanisms can significantly improve the performance of megaprojects, which is well validated in megaprojects in China.