A (new) defense of self‐forgiveness

Abstract In this article, I try to resolve a contradiction arising from the combination of two theses: (1) self‐forgiveness is sometimes morally justified and (2) only victims can rightly forgive. As has been pointed out by other philosophers, both are plausible, but the two taken together are inconsistent. In the literature, self‐forgiveness is painted as an “imperfect” form of forgiveness or as a “second‐best option” because it entails a violation of the victim‘s prerogative to forgive. So far, this view has not directly been challenged. Instead, philosophers have focused on the task of giving a plausible account of self‐forgiveness while leaving the claim according to which forgiveness is among the victim‘s prerogative unchallenged. In this paper, I argue that self‐forgiveness is largely independent from the victim‘s forgiveness both morally and conceptually.