A Game Theory for Resource-Constrained Tactical Cyber Operations
Given the ever-increasing landscape of cyberspace, the battlespace grows at a disproportionate rate to the given tactical resources armed with proper expertise given a finite time span. Tactical cyber operations are acts to defend friendly cyber-terrain with respect to denying the ability for the adversary to conduct operations or degrading their capability to do such acts. We examine how decision makers can optimize such operations under resource constraints to best answer strategic imperatives. This study uses game theory to evaluate scenarios for completing tactical cyber operations given different resource constraints—namely time, expertise, and capabilities—to reach the outcome of a given operation. The problem displayed weighs allocation of finite resources against a vulnerability status of the opposing computer network, and articulates whether an extra percentage of time can expand the operational outcome. We recommend key decisions makers who are in a position to maneuver tactical cyber operations use game theory to inform a data-driven decision calculus that is optimal to meet their strategic imperatives. Future research discussions may include how to help decision makers maneuver intelligence and offensive operations in cyberspace.
Authors
- Josiah Dykstra (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3455-2562)
- Anthony Melaragno (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-3084-962X)
- William H. Casey (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3275-6465)
- Jonathan Goohs (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-9311-1496)
Institutions
- United States Naval Academy (US)
- United States Department of the Navy (US)
- United States Navy (US)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2024-10-28
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/milcom61039.2024.10773898
- Primary Topic
- Information and Cyber Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00