Integration of a Trojan Detection Tool with BFDS: Enhancing Field-Programmable Gate Array Security

Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) have garnered considerable interest and utilization, largely owing to their inherent flexibility and customizability. In this context, electronic design automation (EDA) technology serves as an instrumental facilitator for FPGA applications. Nevertheless, the emergence of hardware Trojans (HTs) represents a major vulnerability in FPGA security. To mitigate the risks associated with hardware Trojans, a formula has been devised to compute the controllability and observability of each signal within logic units in look-up table (LUT) netlists. Subsequently, a security verification methodology aimed at HT detection within these LUT netlists has been developed and incorporated into the EDA tool, BFDS. Detailed procedural steps for HT detection, including interactions with the graphical user interface, are elucidated. The efficacy of this embedded HT detection tool is substantiated through experimental validation. The results from these experiments confirm the capacity of the tool to successfully identify Trojans at the LUT-level netlist while seamlessly integrating into EDA toolchains, thereby enhancing the security of future FPGA design endeavors.