One client, four votes: Ethnopolitical clientelism and its socioeconomic consequences during state capture in Montenegro

Drawing on insights from political sociology and political economy, this article examines the socioeconomic consequences of entrenched ethnopolitical clientelism in postsocialist Montenegro. As a country that experienced its first electoral transfer of power in 2020, Montenegro's political transition was marked by state capture by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), a dominant party that structured the national economy to serve its political interests and support its clients. Throughout its three decades of dominance, the DPS not only developed effective clientelist mechanisms to secure popular support but also employed populist rhetoric to justify these and other undemocratic practices as necessary defenses against the “ethnonational other”, portrayed as intent on undermining Montenegro's statehood. This rhetoric deepened ethnonational antagonisms and strategically inhibited alliance-building across ethnopolitical cleavages that could have threatened DPS rule. Using multivariate analysis on a unique longitudinal dataset spanning 2007 to 2020 (N = 33,889), this study provides empirical evidence that DPS supporters were more likely to secure employment ( mass clientelism ) and advance to higher income categories ( elite clientelism ). The findings also indicate that Serbs faced discrimination not due to their ethnicity per se , but because they were the only ethnonational group overwhelmingly and consistently opposed to the DPS regime and its policies following Montenegro’s independence in 2006.