Economic Dispatch for Networked Microgrid under False Data Injection Attacks

Due to deep integration between power grids and communication networks, cyber-attacks can be launched more readily in networked microgrids, leading to faulty dispatch command and further affecting the total economic cost. To solve this problem, a novel economic dispatch (ED) method is proposed by considering the impact of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on measurement state data and control commands. First, the optimal ED model of networked microgrid is established, which innovatively incorporates dual-network coupling characteristics into the conventional dispatch model including objectives (e.g., operating cost) and constraints (e.g., power balance and output limits). Second, the attacked measurement state data and control commands by FDIAs are described and incorporated into the optimal ED model, forming the new reconstructed model. Third, the impacts of FDIAs on economy and security performances are analyzed based on the proposed indicators of cost and line overload risk, which shows that FDIAs inevitably increase both the operational costs and risks of system. Finally, experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed ED for networked microgrid under FDIAs.