Intersectionality and embodiment: important issues for disability studies

While viewing an intersectional analysis of inequality as fundamental, we published an opinion in this journal (Watermeyer & Swartz, 2023) pointing to how, in practice, it can be (mis)applied in a manner which underestimates the complexity brought by disability's infinite diversity in forms of embodiment.This observation in no way implies that disability, or any other marker of identity for that matter, is somehow intrinsically more significant than any other.Instead, it indicates the need for due consideration of the palpable, phenomenological reality of diverse forms of embodiment, which bring unique interactions between body-minds and contexts.In a critique of our contribution, Ned and colleagues (Ned, Motimele et al., 2024) interpret our position as an attempt to exclusively foreground disability, thereby contributing to epistemic violence and the erasure of the experiences of disabled Global South disability studies scholars of colour.Here, we respond to their critique, showing how we fully support arguments which our interlocutors view us as aiming to refute, while also questioning the voracity of observations regarding our scholarship.We then re-articulate the essential claim of our original paper.Robust debate is essential to disability studies, and we thank Ned, Motimele, et al. (2024) for their engagement with our recent article (Watermeyer and Swartz 2023).As we begin this rejoinder, we need to consider on what grounds Ned and colleagues base their impression that we hold views to which we are in fact opposed.As will become clear, we fully agree with numerous arguments which Ned and colleagues view us as aiming to refute.There are also very apt aspects of critique which we accept, with appreciation.Elsewhere, we were surprised by several claims regarding our