Democratic Reforms in Dictatorships: Elite Divisions, Party Origins, and the Prospects of Political Liberalization

Divisions among regime elites in autocracies are often an important step toward political liberalization. However, we know little about when such divisions contribute to initiating democratic reforms. We argue that whether elite divisions lead to liberalization depends on the historical origins of ruling parties. Using panel matching analyses, we show that the positive effects of elite divisions on political liberalization are significantly reduced when ruling parties originate from national struggles such as revolutions, insurgencies, and independence movements. Specifically, dictators arising from such origins can prevent elite divisions from sparking democratic reforms by providing “carrots” to the military and applying “sticks” to citizens and political opponents. These results hold after multiple robustness tests and additional analyses for causal mechanisms. Our findings suggest that party origins are critical junctures that significantly shape regime prospects more than regime origins suggested by the literature.