Partners in Crime: Comparative Advantage and Kidnapping Cooperation

What explains cooperation between armed groups? Challenging existing literature that assumes armed groups must be similar or not cooperate at all, I argue that explicit differences are key to some cooperation. Comparative advantage explains why rebels and criminals—organizations that typically eschew collaboration—cooperate to produce violence. This article introduces “black market white labeling”—cooperation that emerges when one actor buys an illicit good or service from another and re-brands it as their own. To demonstrate this phenomenon and the conditions under which it occurs, I focus on kidnapping, an underexplored but common form of armed group violence. Drawing on 113 interviews with Colombian kidnappers and hostage recovery personnel from Colombia and the United States, I theorize the conditions under which rebels “outsource” violence to criminal gangs or produce it “in house.” This article explains the organizational dynamics of rebel-criminal cooperation that perpetuate violence against civilians.

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Publication Details

Journal
Comparative Political Studies
Published
2024-12-04
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241302726
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.26

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article

Partners in Crime: Comparative Advantage and Kidnapping Cooperation

Danielle Gilbert
2 citations
Comparative Political Studies
Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
2.26
article

Partners in Crime: Comparative Advantage and Kidnapping Cooperation

Danielle Gilbert
article en
2 citations

Abstract

What explains cooperation between armed groups? Challenging existing literature that assumes armed groups must be similar or not cooperate at all, I argue that explicit differences are key to some cooperation. Comparative advantage explains why rebels and criminals—organizations that typically eschew collaboration—cooperate to produce violence. This article introduces “black market white labeling”—cooperation that emerges when one actor buys an illicit good or service from another and re-brands it as their own. To demonstrate this phenomenon and the conditions under which it occurs, I focus on kidnapping, an underexplored but common form of armed group violence. Drawing on 113 interviews with Colombian kidnappers and hostage recovery personnel from Colombia and the United States, I theorize the conditions under which rebels “outsource” violence to criminal gangs or produce it “in house.” This article explains the organizational dynamics of rebel-criminal cooperation that perpetuate violence against civilians.

Comparative Political StudiesVol. 58(11)
Northwestern University (US)
United States Institute of Peace, Smith Richardson Foundation
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 9%
Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
2.26
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