Searching for Law in Its Own Right: A Fresh Look at the Demarcation Problem

Abstract In this work, I address the “demarcation problem” in law, which invites us to look for the essential properties distinguishing law from nonlaw. First, I introduce the main terms of the discussion, which has seen the traditional view that law is a distinctive practice with its own distinguishing properties pitted against the critical view that law cannot be associated with any such properties. I then turn to what I take to be the core of truth that the critics of the demarcation project have brought to our attention, showing that they have offered a compelling argument even against the most sophisticated treatments of the distinctive traits of law contained in the work of influential mainstream legal theorists. Finally, I argue that, despite the best critical efforts, the demarcation question stands. For, while the critical stance does have a point in challenging the search for necessary and sufficient properties of law, it does not follow that there is no justification at all for the demarcation project, once this project is understood as a circumscribed and context-bound quest for the properties that are fundamental to the core cases of law in a specific tradition.