Quadripartite Evolutionary Game of Incentives for Green Retrofitting of Historical Buildings

Green retrofitting is a potent strategy to improve energy efficiency and support the cultural conservation of historical buildings. China has many historical buildings with significant potential for green retrofitting. Nevertheless, the Chinese green retrofit industry remains in its early stages due to the lack of a comprehensive promotion mechanism. Drawing upon evolutionary game theory, an evolutionary game model was formulated to analyze the interplay among governmental regulators, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), the owners of historical buildings, and tourists. At an extreme disturbance intensity of 100%, a striking decline is observed in the likelihood of ESCOs maintaining the “green retrofit” strategy, with the probability dropping to a minimum of 24.68%. Under specific conditions however this interplay attains an optimal equilibrium state, denoted as (1,1,1,1). It is concluded that governmental regulators exhibit a greater degree of stability compared to other stakeholders, as they maintain their strategies despite external disturbances. Therefore, it is recommended that effective incentives and regulatory frameworks should consider the sensitivities of non-regulatory stakeholders to enhance the success of green retrofitting projects for historical buildings.