Enhancing Resilience and Coordination in Sustainable Logistics Service Supply Chains Through Integrated Investment Contracts

Within the logistics service supply chain, where logistics service integrators and providers collaborate, the role of integrators in orchestrating resources and enhancing supply chain efficiency is pivotal. To motivate logistics service providers to invest in logistics capacity, thereby maintaining supply chain resilience and achieving coordination, a joint contract incorporating cost and benefit sharing is proposed in a novel Stackelberg game model. By analyzing the behavior of various decision-making models—centralized, coordinated, and decentralized—in supply chains, we find that the proposed Stackelberg game model effectively correlates higher investment levels with increased supply chain resilience. The coordination mechanism significantly improves both the level of resilience and the investment amount, leading to enhanced overall profitability. Sensitivity analysis reveals the impact of market pricing, demand stockout penalty costs, and substitute demand prices on these outcomes. This research contributes a new theoretical framework and practical insights into supply chain coordination and investment strategies.