Where and why do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities

This paper uses French data to simultaneously estimate the impact of two types of connections on government subsidies allocated to municipalities. Investigating different types of connection in a same setting helps to distinguish between the different motivations that could drive pork-barreling. We differentiate between municipalities where ministers held office before their appointment to the government and those where they lived as children. Exploiting ministers’ entries into and exits from the government, we show that municipalities where a minister was mayor receive 30% more investment subsidies when the politician they are linked to joins the government, and a similar size decrease when the minister departs. In contrast, we do not observe these outcomes for municipalities where ministers lived as children. These findings indicate that altruism toward childhood friends and family does not fuel pork-barreling, and suggest that altruism toward adulthood social relations or career concerns matter. We also present complementary evidence suggesting that observed pork-barreling is the result of soft influence of ministers, rather than of their formal control over the administration they lead. • We estimate the impact of two connection types on subsidies to French municipalities. • We distinguish municipalities where ministers served from where they grew up. • Municipalities with minister-mayors gain subsidies when they join, lose when they leave. • We see no similar outcomes for municipalities where ministers grew up as children. • Findings suggest career concerns or adult relations drive subsidies, not childhood ties.