O problema do relativismo na ciência rigorosa de Husserl

This article aims to reflect on the problem faced by Husserl in his project to build a rigorous science. In Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, a work in which the thinker illustrates his claim in more detail, there are two obstacles to be overcome, according to Husserl, expressed in the form of historicism and naturalism. Both concepts, by relativizing the truth and reducing it to a material understanding, are destined for skepticism. It follows that a pure phenomenology, which meets the conditions to make philosophy a rigorous science, cannot be tied to empirical facts. To this end, Husserl promotes a distinction between physical and psychic phenomena, between material reality and ideal truth. Therefore, phenomenology, being a science of essences, whose object of study is the ideal truth, seeks to overcome mere materiality and assert itself as a pure doctrine, whose central object is the pure phenomenon, stripped of all materiality, revealed in its ideal, universal condition.